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Abstract
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA") is the
latest in a series of laws championed by the copyright industries to
give those industries greater technological control over their content.
This article argues that the anti-circumvention provisions threaten
free speech by giving copyright owners extralegal protection for their
works.
Reliance on technology is part of a larger strategy to reprivatize
copyrights by eliminating judicial oversight. Copyright as a legal
concept contains numerous provisions that restrict the monopoly
control granted to copyright owners. These restrictions are vital to
maintaining copyright's constitutional purpose and ensuring the law
does not infringe on important free speech rights. If copyright is
transformed into a technological concept, courts no longer will be in a
position to enforce these important limitations on copyright, and
copyright owners will be able to use these extralegal protection
measures to expand their control over content. This shift toward
technological protection makes it more difficult for members of
society to transform texts through techniques such as appropriation as
a way of actively participating in the construction of their culture.
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA create legal
protections for the technological measures that copyright owners use
to control content. Users who wish to use copyrighted works for
noninfringing purposes will not be able to obtain the tools necessary
for their purposes. The ultimate outcome of technological control and
other attempts to reprivatize copyright (such as the DMCA's
mechanisms for imposing liability on online service providers) is a
dramatic reduction in the utility of communication networks like the
Internet. This privatization trend is transforming the Internet from a
two-way medium of active cultural participation among citizens into a
one-way medium for content distribution to passive consumers.
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Introduction
"Copyright protects not just the financial interest of people
who create artistic or intellectual property, but the very
existence of creative work."'
"Has it occurred to anyone, that the private ownership of
mass culture is a bit of a contradiction in terms?,
2
The fate of Napster has made copyright law front-page news in
recent months. The lawsuit against the file-sharing software
distributor provides a unique opportunity for the public to engage in
an important policy debate regarding the appropriate extent of
copyright protection in a digital world. What has made significantly
less news is a recent addition to the law that goes beyond copyright
infringement. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
("DMCA")3 is the latest in a series of laws championed by the
copyright industries (publishing, music, film, television, and software
firms) to give those industries greater technological control over their
content. This article argues that this trend is part of a strategy to
transform copyright from a legal concept to a technological concept in
an effort to reprivatize copyright law.
Copyright as a legal concept contains numerous provisions that
restrict the monopoly control granted to copyright owners.' These
legal restrictions are vital to maintaining copyright's constitutional
purpose and ensuring that the law does not infringe on important free
speech rights. If copyright is transformed into a technological
concept, courts no longer will be in a position to enforce these
important limitations on copyright, and copyright owners will be able
to use these extralegal protection measures to expand their control
over content beyond accepted constitutional limits.
Expanded private control over content is worrisome because that
content, be it books, newspapers, movies, music, etc., plays a large
role in defining our culture and shared experience. Indeed many
scholars have argued that our entire notion of reality is a social
construction Even if this were an exaggeration, it is clear that
1. Jack Valenti, There's No Free Hollywood, N.Y. Times A23 (June 21, 2000).
2. Negativland, Fair Use: The Story of the Letter U and the Numeral 2, 195 (Seeland
1995).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2001).
4. See generally 17 U.S.C §§ 101-1332 (2001).
5. See e.g. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (1966); Jonathan Potter, Representing
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language and cultural texts shape our understanding of our world.
Private control over content limits the ability of individuals to
articulate their own meanings and thus to define their own culture,
which goes to the heart of First Amendment protections for free
speech.
The DMCA increases private control over content by creating
legal protection for the anti-circumvention technologies that
copyright owners use to control content. Users who wish to use
copyrighted works for constitutionally protected purposes will not be
able to obtain the tools necessary for their purposes. This creates a
significant threat to free speech and cultural autonomy by making it
more difficult for individuals to manipulate cultural texts (especially
visual works) through practices such as appropriation and
juxtaposition. These practices are an important form of political
engagement since they allow citizens to take a more active role in the
construction of the values and ideas that shape their society.
The ultimate outcome of technological control and other
attempts to reprivatize copyright (such as the mechanisms for
imposing liability on online service providers) is a dramatic reduction
in the utility of communication networks like the Internet. This trend
is transforming the Internet from a two-way medium of active cultural
participation among citizens into a one-way medium for content
distribution to passive consumers.
The copyright industries, particularly the Motion Picture
Association of America ("MPAA") and the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA"), are working to develop anti-
circumvention technology to prevent unauthorized access to their
content.6 Major copyright owners also have become extremely
aggressive in enforcing their new legal rights granted by the DMCA.
Examples include recent lawsuits against MP3.com, Napster,
iCraveTV.com, and DeCSS.7 Jack Valenti, head of the MPAA,
acknowledged the current strategy: "If we have to file a thousand
Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction (1966).
6. The RIAA backs standards that protect the copyright interests of artists and
labels. Matt Richtel, Record Labels Assert Control in Cyberspace, N.Y. Times C1 (July 5,
1999). The MPAA and major movie studios refused to release films on DVD until the
consumer electronics industry included CSS, a copy protection technology in DVD
players. Benny Evangelista, Digital Dupes, S.F. Chron. B1 (Jan. 31, 2000).
7. Evangelista, supra n. 6; Sara Robinson, 3 Copyright Lawsuits Test Limits of New
Digital Media, N.Y. Times C8 (Jan. 24, 2000); Denise Caruso, Control Over Content. The
Case of an Internet TV Provider Illustrates Entertainment Industry's Copyright Power, N.Y.
Times C4 (Mar. 13, 2000).
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lawsuits a day, we'll do it."8
Many commentators argue that the expanded legal protections
granted by the DMCA are giving copyright owners power that goes
beyond the purpose of the copyright statute.9 A key component of the
DMCA are the anti-circumvention provisions codified in chapter
twelve of the Copyright Act. These provisions are crucial to copyright
owners' strategy to control content on the Internet.
The new provisions essentially make it illegal to circumvent any
of the technological measures copyright owners use to control access
to their content. The law contains exceptions for instances where
users circumvent these measures for permissible purposes, such as fair
use, reverse engineering, and encryption research." However, the new
law effectively outlaws the development of the circumvention tools
that users would need for these permissible purposes. Without access
to circumvention technologies, users will find it difficult to use
content even for a legitimate, noninfringing purpose.
Prior to the DMCA, the United States Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of
America restricted the ability of copyright owners to sue technology
distributors for contributory infringement. " The DMCA creates a
new cause of action separate from copyright infringement and
therefore outside of the limits of the Sony ruling. This is not the first
time that copyright owners have successfully persuaded Congress to
expand control over content beyond copyright infringement.
Congress already had begun to control technology through
amendments to the Communications Act of 1934 that prohibit the
theft of cable and satellite television transmissions and through the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA"), 12 which protects the
technology used to prevent serial digital reproduction of sound
8. Evangelista, supra n. 6.
9. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 359 (1999); Bruce
Haring, Protected or Locked Out? Foes of Copyright Act Say It Hampers Net's Growth,
USA Today, 3D (Feb. 29, 2000); Matt Jackson, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998. A Proposed Amendment to Accommodate Free Speech, 5 Comm. L. & Policy 61, 84-
87 (2000); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 704 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 519, 521 (1999).
10. See Samuelson, supra n. 6. (Samuelson argues that even these exceptions are too
narrow possibly to the point of being unconstitutional.).
11. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).




Other commentators have done a thorough job of discussing the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA."3 This article attempts to
place the DMCA in the context of other attempts to control
technology. At the same time, it offers an analysis of the first court
case to deal directly with the anti-circumvention provisions.
Furthermore, the article highlights the increased focus on technology
as a means of copyright enforcement. These laws signal an attempt by
the copyright industries to convert copyright from a legal concept to a
technological concept. This shift to technological protection measures
gives copyright owners extralegal control over their works. Thus, it is
one more means of "self-help" to control content." The basic
dilemma for policymakers is that the Internet is designed to facilitate
the two-way communication of content, while the copyright industries
traditionally have relied on one-way distribution of content.
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, one of the first cases
applying the new anti-circumvention measures of the DMCA, the
district court exemplified this paradigm shift by refusing to consider
any standard copyright defenses. 5 This case, currently under appeal
at the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, highlights three
fundamental tensions surrounding the DMCA:
* Is the fair use doctrine constitutionally mandated to reconcile
copyright with the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment?
* Can Congress give copyright owners powers that extend their
control beyond the Copyright Clause?
* Can Congress constitutionally overturn the staple article of
commerce doctrine articulated in the Sony case if doing so
significantly infringes on free speech?
I
Copyright's Purpose and Technological Change
The goal of copyright law is to give the creator limited control
over her work to provide an incentive for the creation of new works
13. See Nimmer, supra n. 9; Samuelson, supra n. 6.
14. For a more extended discussion of copyright owners' attempts to rely on "self-
help" measures, see Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems
and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161 (1997); Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089 (1998).
15. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
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for the public's benefit. 6 Copyright, thus, strives to provide a
"balance" between the creator's need to recoup her investment in the
work and the ultimate goal of providing the public with as much
access to the work as possible.7 The Supreme Court has articulated
this goal on many occasions, including this succinct summary:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by
the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon
the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair, return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good 8
One cannot overemphasize that the constitutional purpose of
copyright is to stimulate content creation for the public's benefit, not
to create a private property right based on a moral notion of
ownership.
The conundrum for copyright is how to create the appropriate
level of incentives. If too much protection is given, access to the work
is unduly restricted. If too little protection is given, the optimum
number of works might not be created. As Landes and Posner note,
"For copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal
doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from
creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access
and the costs of administering copyright protection."'9
Maintaining this delicate balance has become increasingly
difficult as new means of producing and distributing content have
been developed. Digital communication, in general, and the Internet
16. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Leg. Stud. 325, 326 (1989).
17. Copyright is considered necessary because information products are similar to
"public goods" in that they are often nonrivalrous and nonexclusive. Traditionally, these
qualities lead to underproduction of the product in the private marketplace. Copyright
creates a legal right to exclude as a means of helping the market for information products
operate more like markets for excludable products. Given the space constraints of this
paper, it will be assumed that the reader is familiar with the basic economic theories that
underlie the enactment of United States copyright law.
18. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
19. Id. at 326.
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in particular, have dramatically reduced production and distribution
costs. Unlike previous reproduction technologies that were either
capital-intensive (a printing press) or labor-intensive (a copy
machine), the Internet allows for cheap and effortless reproduction
and distribution. Copyright holders have argued vigorously that
expanded protection is now necessary because the increased ease of
infringement outweighs any cost savings that copyright owners might
realize through their own use of this new technology.0 What's more,
copyright owners have argued that new enforcement mechanisms are
required to combat infringing activity. They claim that simply
increasing the penalty for piracy is not enough; that self-help
measures are the only effective means to prevent widespread
infringement.
Today, copyright law is being supplanted with technological
measures developed by copyright owners to provide extralegal
protection for their works. These "self-help" measures (often
grouped under the heading of digital rights management or DRM)
provide almost limitless opportunities for content control, including
digital watermarks, encryption, anti-copying codes, pay-per-use
systems, and verification systems that allow content to be viewed only
on a particular machine. The most common types of self-help
measures in use today are those that restrict initial access to a work
(such as encryption of satellite transmissions and CSS to prevent
copying of DVDs) and those that prevent copying of the work (such
as Macrovision to prevent copying of analog videocassettes).21
Digital rights management systems likely will become much
more effective and efficient in preventing copyright infringement than
20. See e.g. H.R. Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop. of the H.R. Jud. Comm., Nil
Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 21-22, 35, 69 (Feb.
7, 1996) (statement of Jack Valenti, Chairman, Motion Picture Assn. of Am.)[hereinafter
Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995]; id. (statements of Jack Valenti, Chairman, Motion
Picture Assn. of Am.; Edward P. Murphy, Pres. Natl. Music Publishers Assn.; and Barbara
Munder; Senior Vice-Pres., McGraw-Hill Cos.); H.R. Subcomm. on Courts and Intell.
Prop of the H.R. Jud. Comm., Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet
Service Providers: Hearings on S. 1146, 105th Cong. (Sept. 4, 1997); H.R. Subcomm. on
Courts and Intell. Prop. of the H.R. Jud. Comm., Online Copyright Liability Limitation
Act: Hearings on H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (Sept. 16-17, 1997).
21. The motion picture industry argues that CSS is an access control rather than a
copying control. Yet, the supposed purpose is to prevent DVDs from being played on
unauthorized machines that would allow copying. For a general discussion of the
possibilities and potential pitfalls of trusted systems, see Mark Gimbel, Note, Some
Thoughts On the Implications of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Law, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1671, 1675-80 (1998); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and
Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
137,138-40 (1997).
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traditional legal remedies. Therefore, they may serve an important
function in enhancing the constitutional goal of providing incentives
for the creation of new works.22 The potential danger, however, is that
copyright owners can use these technological measures not only to
prevent infringement, but also to avoid the limitations that copyright
law places on their monopoly privilege.
II
Constitutional Limits on Copyright - Fair Use and the First
Amendment
While the copyright law has changed dramatically over the years
as the result of lobbying by various interest groups, the statute must
still serve its constitutional purpose as outlined in Article I, section
8.23 The statute contains numerous provisions restricting the ability of
copyright holders to enforce their monopoly, both to serve the
constitutional mandate of "promoting progress in science and the
useful arts," and to ensure the statute does not trample on First
Amendment protections for free speech.24 The courts normally have
the authority and duty to ensure that copyright law does not exceed
the restraints imposed on it by the Constitution.
Even with the limited duration of the copyright term and the lack
of protection for ideas, facts, and discoveries (often referred to as the
idea/expression dichotomy), lawmakers repeatedly have
acknowledged that the rights granted to the copyright holder are
extremely broad and potentially counterproductive. Thus, the
copyright statute includes a number of exceptions to the copyright
holder's monopoly.25 Many of these exceptions have been carved out
for powerful special interest groups. For example, the statute contains
22. However, assuming that DRM systems do make copyright more efficient, this
implies that the rights granted to the copyright owner can be defined more narrowly to
maintain an equitable balance between creators and users.
23. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The purpose of copyright is to "Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
24. For a recent discussion on this point, see Benkler, supra n. 9. Professor Benkler
argues that from a First Amendment perspective, the baseline should be the public
domain which allows for access and use of information. Id. All restrictions on the public
domain, including the provisions of the Copyright Act, should be viewed as content-
neutral restrictions on speech for First Amendment analysis. Id.
25. Sections 107-121 of the Act place limitations on the copyright holder's exclusive
rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-121 (2000).
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numerous provisions that benefit educators and librarians." In
addition to these specific exceptions, there are some broad limits on
the copyright holder's monopoly.27 The most important limitation is
that of fair use.28
Fair use furthers the goals of copyright by limiting the power of
the copyright owner to control certain uses of the work. As the
United States Supreme Court noted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
"From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair
use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts. ' ' 29 The statute offers a nonexclusive list of potential fair
uses of copyrighted works, including "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research.' 30 Fair use allows a
software developer to use reverse engineering to build on the work of
others,3' and permits newspapers to quote from books and scholars to
quote from journal articles. All of these uses benefit society by
propagating the ideas expressed in the copyrighted work.
In addition to protecting copyright's statutory purpose, fair use
plays an important role in upholding First Amendment free speech
rights. Fair use allows individuals to quote directly from the works
they are debating, thus supporting an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate.33 Direct quotation is often the only effective means of
participating in that debate, especially when the work in question is
primarily visual in nature. In Wojnarowicz v. American Family
Association., the American Family Association ("AFA") produced a
pamphlet protesting government funding for art. 4 The pamphlet used
26. Id. §§ 108, 110.
27. For example, the first sale doctrine prevents the copyright owner from
controlling the subsequent sale or transfer of any particular copy or phonorecord in most
instances. Id. §109.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
29. 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
31. Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993).
32. As one court noted, "The interview is an invaluable source of material for social
scientists, and later use of verbatim quotations within reason is both foreseeable and
desirable." Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1059 (1987). However, fair use does not create an unlimited license to quote from
texts. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that
copying 300 words from an unpublished manuscript was not a fair use).
33. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). For example, reproducing a
picture in order to criticize government funding for the artist was held to be a fair use in
Wojnarowicz v. Am. Fam. Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
34. Id. at 134.
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samples of Wojnarowicz's work as examples of publicly funded art of
which the AFA disapproved.35 The court held that copying the
original art was protected by fair use because the dominant purpose
for the reproduction was criticism." In Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Association, where the defendant copied frames from the famous
Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assassination, the court held
that the defendant's use was fair use, in part because "[t]here is a
public interest in having the fullest information available on the
murder of President Kennedy."37
Fair use also allows citizens to regain control over their culture in
an era when the copyright industries have commodified much of the
cultural landscape.38 Fair use gives the audience power over the
discourse which shapes their lives. Author Salman Rushdie observes
that "[t]hose who do not have power over the story that dominates
their lives, power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it,
and change it as times change, truly are powerless, because they
cannot think new thoughts."39
The dominant groups in a society, with their ability to gain access
to traditional media systems, have unbridled power in communicating
their messages to the public. What prevents these groups from
exerting a completely hegemonic influence is the ability of individuals
and weaker groups to create resistant or oppositional readings of
these messages.' Quoting from popular texts is a powerful tool in the
creation of resistant readings of those texts. "The act of appropriating
from this media assault represents a kind of liberation ... it is a much
needed form of self-defense against the one-way, corporate-
consolidated media barrage .. . .Appropriators claim the right to
35. Id.
36. Id. at 134, 143, 147.
37. 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
38. Jackson, supra n. 9, at 84-87.
39. Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1536 (1993) (quoting
Salman Rushdie, Excerpts from Rushdie Address: 1,000 Days 'Trapped Inside a
Metaphor,' N.Y. Times B8 (Dec. 12,1991)).
40. Stuart Hall, Encoding/decoding, in Culture, Media, Language 128 (Hutchinson &
Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 1980). The concept that the reader plays an active role in
constructing the meaning of a text is not new. Literary studies have long considered
various ways in which meaning is constructed. One popular paradigm is semiotics, whose
leading proponent was Roland Barthes. See Roland Barthes, S/Z (Richard Miller, trans.,
Hill and Wang 1974); Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (U. Cal.. Berkeley
Press 1977). For a comparison of various theories of interpretation, see Norman Holland,
The Critical I (Columbia U. Press 1992).
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create with mirrors. ' 1 Rosemary Coombe argues that in a
postmodern world, "political action must involve a critical
engagement with commodified cultural forms., 42 The ability to use
popular (copyrighted) expression, which has entered the public
vernacular, is an essential component of this process. Similarly, Elkin-
Koren argues that:
[T]he struggle over meaning making [is] the essence of
political action in postmodernity. Culture is thus perceived
as an ongoing process of meaning-making through
communicative activities, that is through social dialogue ....
Social agents enjoy different levels of power to fix and
transform meaning depending on their ability to access and
control access to sources of signification and circulation. 3
Even if one rejects the postmodern perspective that politics is
essentially the struggle over interpretation, it is clear that once a
message has been communicated to the public, quoting from that text
is an important means of critiquing the message. Appropriation,
which allows individuals to juxtapose disparate elements and give
them new meanings, has long been used as a means of commenting
on society, and on media messages in particular." In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose, the United States Supreme Court noted that an
important goal of fair use is to allow for transformative works.45
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary
for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the
41. Negativland, supra n. 2, at 196. The history of modern art is filled with examples
of "quotes" from various texts being placed in a new context in order to provoke new ways
of thinking about the original text. See Eddie Wolfram, History of Collage (Macmillan
Publg. Co., Inc. 1975).
42. Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1853, 1855 (1991); see also Keith
Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding" Rights, 68 Chi-Kent L.
Rev. 805 (1993).
43. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 345, 400 (1995).
44. See generally E.K. Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for
Appropriation, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1472 (1993); see also S. Del Peral, Using Copyright
Visual Works in Collage: A Fair Use Analysis, 54 Alb. L. Rev. 141 (1989).
45. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citation omitted).
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confines of copyright.46
The ability to appropriate and transform texts allows groups outside
the mainstream to resist hegemony. In short, the ability to quote from
a text can be essential to constructing an effective critique of that text
and the ideas it embodies.
Texts in this context mean much more than written or printed
materials. The anti-circumvention restrictions discussed in this paper
do not significantly threaten the quotation of written texts because
those texts can be transcribed, albeit tediously. However,
transcription is almost meaningless when the content is a picture or
moving image. As the band Negativland notes:
We are now all immersed in an ever-growing media
environment-an environment just as real and just as
affecting as the natural one from which it somehow sprang.
Today we are surrounded by canned ideas, images, music,
text .... Large increments of our daily sensory input are not
focused on the physical reality around us, but on the media
that saturates it.
For visual works, direct copying is necessary to effectively
comment on the work. For example, in the video Dreamworlds,
Professor Sut Jhally of the University of Massachusetts juxtaposed
scenes he copied from music videos on MTV with a rape scene from a
movie to suggest that music videos contain images of sexual
violence.48 Many commentators argue that this right lies at the heart
of fair use exception for comment and criticism.49 Thus, the right to
quote from a text is an important means of furthering First
Amendment goals since it facilitates the debate over ideas and values.
Overall, fair use operates as a "safety valve" to prevent the copyright
statute from trampling First Amendment rights by allowing for
certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted works without liability for
copyright infringement. °
46. Id. at 579.
47. Negativland, supra n. 2, at 195-96.
48. David Kaplan, They Want Their MTV Back, Newsweek 68 (May 20, 1991).
49. See Ames, supra n. 44; Del Peral, supra n. 44. For a discussion of the importance
of fair use for media criticism in particular, see Matt Jackson, Commerce Versus Art: The
Transformation of Fair Use, 39 J. Broad. & Elec. Media 190 (1995).
50. Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox,
20-21 (Hill & Wang 1994). In the 1970's, much legal scholarship argued that fair use was
especially important from a First Amendment perspective. Id. Beginning in the 1980s,
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III
Technology and Contributory Infringement
While fair use is codified in the Copyright Act, the legal right
becomes meaningless if users are. unable to take advantage of it. As
communication technology has advanced, various technologies make
it possible for individuals to appropriate copyrighted material for
permissible (or infringing) purposes. Sut hally used videotape
technology to create Dreamworlds; Public Enemy, Negativland, and
many others use audio recording technology to create their works.
Until recently, there was little that copyright owners could do to
prevent users from engaging in fair use activities. If the copyright
owner felt that the use was not fair, she could sue the alleged infringer
in court. The court would determine whether the use was fair.
Because finding and suing individual infringers is often difficult and
impractical, copyright owners have attempted to use the doctrine of
contributory infringement to control the use of technology that
facilitates infringement.
Contributory infringement is a doctrine developed by the courts
to hold a "third-party" liable for the actions of the direct infringer. 5
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringement committed by another ... [but] [t]he
absence of such express language in the copyright statute
does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright
infringements on certain parties who have not themselves
engaged in the infringing activities. For vicarious liability is
imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of
contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader
problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to
hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.
Contributory infringement occurs when the third party (1) knows
the infringement is taking place and (2) "induces, causes, or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct."53 In applying the test
for contributory infringement, courts use the constructive knowledge
standard; asking whether the defendant knew or should have known
many fair use analyses have focused on problems of market failure rather than free speech
concerns. Benkler, supra n. 9, at 389-90.
51. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35 (footnote omitted).
52. Id.
53. Gershwin Pubg. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (holding that a management firm that authorized performance of copyrighted
works is liable for contributory infringement).
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that infringing activity was taking place. The difficulty in determining
when contributory infringement takes place was acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers: "In some
cases where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice questions
may arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an accomplice in
a subsequent illegal use by the buyer."54
More than seventy years later, the Court again had to address
"articles of commerce" in the landmark decision of Universal City
Studios v. Sony Corporation of America.55 In Sony, the Court stated,
"[T]he contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the
recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the
courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to
the products or activities that make such duplication possible."56 In
Sony, the issue was whether selling videocassette recorders ("VCRs")
equipped with television tuners constituted contributory
infringement. 7 The plaintiffs in Sony argued that end users purchased
VCRs and then committed copyright infringement by taping
copyrighted programs off the air. 8
Since the Sony case involved the sale of hardware rather than the
sale of copyrighted content,59 the Court borrowed from the doctrine
of contributory infringement under patent law rather than applying
the test for contributory liability developed in previous copyright
cases.' The Court held that, "[T]he sale of copying equipment, like
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."61 The Sony Court rejected the
argument that "supplying the 'means' to accomplish an infringing
activity and encouraging that'activity through advertisement are
sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement." 62
For sixteen years, the Sony case has stood for the proposition
54. 222 U.S. 55,62 (1911).
55. 464 U.S. 417.
.56. Id. at 442.
57. Id. at 419-21.
58. Id.
59. There is an extensive line of cases dealing with contributory infringement in
circumstances that do not involve staple articles of commerce. This paper focuses on the
Sony case because it is most relevant in discussions of sections 1201(a)(2), 1201(b)(1), and
the Reimerdes case.
60. Sony, 464 U.S. at 419.
61. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 436.
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that copyright owners cannot restrict the use of technology merely
because that technology may be used to commit infringement.
Defendants can be held liable only when the technology has no
substantial noninfringing uses. Thus, copyright owners cannot easily
sue the manufacturers of photocopiers or other equipment that allow
end-users to commit copyright infringement. Indeed, when
photocopiers were first put into widespread use in libraries, copyright
owners sued the libraries rather than the companies that
manufactured or distributed the photocopiers.63
The Sony doctrine was cited in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., a case specifically related to circumvention technology. ' In the
case Vault created a diskette that prevented the unauthorized
copying of any computer program placed on the disk.65 Quaid created
a diskette that essentially allowed users to make fully functional
copies of the software program stored on the Vault diskette.66 Quaid
acknowledged that many users would use this feature to commit
copyright infringement but that section 117 of the Copyright Act
permits users to make archival copies of software programs. 67 Quaid
argued that since its diskette allowed users to make permissible
archival copies, it had a substantial noninfringing use. 6 The Court of
Appeals agreed and held that, under Sony, Quaid was not liable for
contributory infringement.69
However, lower courts have not extended the "staple article of
commerce" doctrine used by the Court in Sony to situations where
the manufacturer of the technology has direct knowledge of the
infringing activity and an ongoing relationship with the direct
infringer. In a case where the defendant manufactured time-loaded
cassettes, 71 the defense argued that these blank cassettes have a
substantial, noninfringing use in that they can be used to duplicate
authorized or noncopyrighted sound recordings.71 The District Court
reasoned that "[the Sony holding] would not extend to products
63. See e.g. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. C1. 1973), affid by an
equally divided Supreme Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
64. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 256.
66. Id. at 257.
67. Id. at 262.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 256-57, 262-67.
70. Cassettes loaded to a customized time length, rather than standard 30, 60, or 90-
minute lengths.
71. A&M Records, Inc. v. General Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F. Supp 1449,
1456 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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specifically manufactured for counterfeiting activity, even if such
products have substantial noninfringing uses.",1 In this case, there was
overwhelming evidence that the defendant knew that the cassettes
would be used to duplicate infringing recordings, and that he
provided other services in addition to supplying the blank cassettes.73
In a case involving copyright infringement in the manufacture of
computer chips to illegally intercept satellite television programming,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Sony defense of "substantial,
noninfringing uses" because the defendant actively promoted the
device as an aid to infringement, and not for "legitimate,
noninfringing uses."7
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Napster could not rely
on the Sony defense. 75 The court stated:
We are compelled to make a clear distinction between the
architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in
relation to the operational capacity of the system .... The
distinction shows that if a computer system operator learns
of specific infringing material available on his system and
fails to purge such material from the system, the operator
knows of and contributes to direct infringement. Conversely,
absent any specific information which identifies infringing
activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of
the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material 6
The court stressed that, unlike the VCR manufacturers in Sony,
Napster did more than merely distribute a technology; it also
operated a system of servers that facilitated the infringing activity. 77
IV
Legislative Initiatives that Limited Sony
The Sony case severely limited the ability of copyright owners to
restrict the development of new technologies related to content
distribution and reproduction. Copyright owners instead turned their
attention to specific legislation that would protect their use of
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
846 (11th Cir. 1990).




technology to control content. Two key areas where this battle was
fought were cable/satellite television distribution and digital music
recordings.
A. Cable/Satellite Black Boxes
Cable providers have been concerned with the theft of cable
service for a long time, especially the loss of income from the theft of
lucrative pay channels such as HBO and Showtime. Individuals could
buy "black boxes" to decode scrambled cable signals. In addition, the
cable television industry relied on satellite distribution of
programming, leading to the increased popularity of television
receive-only ("TVRO") satellite dishes. Programming distributors
began to scramble their satellite signals, resulting in the proliferation
of satellite "black boxes" that could descramble the signals. Congress
eventually amended the Communications Act of 19348 to prohibit the
manufacture or distribution of technology designed to decrypt cable
and satellite television programming.79
Because these prohibitions are contained in the Communications
Act, they neither affect nor are affected by copyright law. Theft of
programming service, in and of itself, does not technically constitute
copyright infringement, since none of the copyright holder's rights are
violated.' The access restrictions are narrowly drawn to cover only
the transmission of television programming. Once an individual has
gained authorized access to the programming, there is no law banning
the use of technology that may aid in copyright infringement such as
VCRs.
78. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2001). [hereinafter Communications Act].
79. The prohibition on theft of cable service is codified in section 553 and the
prohibition on interception of wireless (including satellite) service are codified in section
605. Id. § 605. Section 553(a) provides: (1) No person shall intercept or receive or assist in
intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system ... (2)
... the term "assist in intercepting or receiving" shall include the manufacture or
distribution of equipment intended ... for unauthorized reception [of cable service]. Id.
§ 553(a) (emphasis added). Section 605(e)(4) provides:
Any person who manufactures, assembles, modifies, imports, exports, sells,
or distributes any... device or equipment, knowing or having reason to
know that the device or equipment is primarily of assistance in the
unauthorized decryption of [satellite programming] shall be fined not more
than $500,000... or imprisoned for not more than 5 years for each violation,
or both.
Id. § 605(e)(4).
80. Similarly, stealing a book from a store is theft rather than infringement.
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B. Serial Copy Management Systems
The Communications Act restrictions only cover access to cable
and satellite television transmissions. With the proliferation of digital
technology, content providers became concerned about the ability of
consumers to make endless, perfect digital reproductions of their
works. The RIAA fought the introduction of digital audio tape
("DAT") recorders and eventually convinced Congress to pass the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA"). 8' The AHRA
required that all consumer-grade digital audio recording devices come
equipped with the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) or some
other system that prevents consumers from making serial digital
copies.' In addition, the law banned the distribution of devices that
were designed to circumvent the SCMS. 3 Section 1002(c) states:
No person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any
device, or offer or perform any service, the primary purpose
or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
otherwise circumvent any [technology that prevents serial
copying].
The AHRA created, for the first time in copyright law, a cause of
action separate from copyright infringement. In addition, this was the
first time that restrictions were placed on technology to prevent
copyright infringement, as opposed to the Communication Act's
restrictions on technology to prevent unauthorized access to a
transmission. However, the AHRA was narrowly tailored to prevent
serial digital audio copying only; therefore, the new law did not ban
all digital copying technology.
With the advent of MP3 files, thousands of individuals began to
download music from the Internet. Early on, this craze was limited to
listening to music while sitting at a computer. Capitalizing on the
popularity of portable CD players, Diamond Multimedia developed a
portable MP3 listening device known as the "Rio" that allows users to
transfer MP3 files from a computer hard drive to the Rio player 5 The
81. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(2001)).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a). The purpose of the law was to prevent individuals from
making a digital copy of sound recording and then using that copy to make more digital
copies.
83. Id. § 1002(c).
84. Id.
85. Michel Marriott, Portable Music Player Uses No Tape or Disk, N.Y. Times G3
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RIAA sued Diamond Multimedia for violating the AHRA.86 The
Ninth Circuit held that Diamond's Rio portable MP3 player was not a
digital audio recording device as defined by the AHRA and therefore
not subject to the AHRA's restrictions.87
V
The Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA
The DMCA added a new chapter to the Copyright Act that
focuses on protecting anti-circumvention technology rather than
adjusting the bundle of rights granted to a copyright holder.' The
DMCA extended legal protection to the technological measures that
copyright owners use to safeguard their monopoly privilege. In doing
so, Congress went significantly beyond the narrow provisions in the
AHRA and the Communications Act. The DMCA protects
technological measures that control all access to a work rather than
only controlling access to transmissions (as in the Communications
Act), and technological measures that prevent any unauthorized use
of the work, rather than measures that prevent only serial copying (as
in AHRA).
The new Chapter Twelve contains three major provisions
designed to protect the technology that copyright owners use to
restrict the use of their content: (1) a provision that prohibits the
circumvention of controls that prevent unauthorized access to a work,
(2) a provision that prohibits the distribution of technology that
circumvents controls that prevent unauthorized access to a work, and
(3) a provision that prohibits the distribution of technology that
circumvents controls that protect the rights granted to the copyright
89owner.
Subsection 1201(a)(1) states, "No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [the Copyright Act]." This subsection took effect in
November of 2000, after a rulemaking proceeding by the Librarian of
Congress determined whether any users of any specific "class of
works" would be adversely affected in their ability to make
(Sept. 24, 1998).
86. Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998); affd on other grounds, 180 F..3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
87. Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
88. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001).
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noninfringing uses of that particular class of works." For example, if
the rulemaking proceeding determined that librarians would be
unable to make legitimate noninfringing uses of databases, then they
would be permitted to circumvent the technological measures used to
restrict access to the work. The law requires the Librarian of
Congress to repeat this rulemaking process every three years.'
According to the report that accompanied the DMCA, the purpose of
the delay in the enactment of this clause and the requirement that a
rulemaking proceeding take place every three years was to ensure the
"availability of works in the marketplace for lawful uses." 92
On October 27, 2000, the Librarian of Congress determined that
the only two classes of works that would be exempt from section
1201(a)(1) would be: (1) compilations consisting of lists of websites
blocked by filtering software applications and (2) literary works,
including computer programs and databases, protected by access
control mechanisms that failed to permit access because of
malfunction, damage or obsolescence.93
The other two provisions of Chapter 12 took effect when the law
was enacted on October 28, 1998. Section 1201(a)(2) prevents
manufacturing, importing, or otherwise trafficking in "any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof" that
(A) is primarily designed to circumvent a technological protection
measure that effectively controls access to a work, (B) "has only
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work," or (C) is marketed with knowledge that it will be used to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work.94  This section prohibits trafficking in circumvention
technology that effectively controls access to a work, whereas section
(a)(1) prohibits the use of circumvention technology."
Section 1201(b)(1) is almost identical to section 1201(a)(2). This
90. Id. § 1201(a)(1).
91. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
92. H.R. Rpt. 105-551(11), at § 37 (July 22, 1998). The House Report indicates the
rulemaking proceeding should be repeated every two years. Id. This was changed in
§ 1201(a)(1)(C) to three years. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
93. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copy. Protection Sys. for Access
Control Tech., 65 Fed. Reg. 64556-64562 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
201).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). The law contains specific exemptions too detailed to
discuss here. For an analysis of all the anti-circumvention provisions, see Samuelson, supra
n. 9.
95. Cf. id. § 1201(a)(1).
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section prohibits trafficking in any device that circumvents a
protection measure that protects a right of the copyright owner. 96
While section 1201(a)(2) prohibits trafficking in devices that provide
unauthorized access to a copyrighted work (even if no copyright
infringement takes place), section 1201(b)(1) prohibits trafficking in
devices that circumvent a protection measure and thereby facilitate
copyright infringement (regardless of whether access to the work is
authorized).
For example, a copyright owner might employ two separate
protection measures: one that prevents unauthorized access to the
work and another that prevents unauthorized reproduction of the
work (reproduction being one of the rights granted to the copyright
owner). Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits the circumvention of the first
protection measure, section 1201(a)(2) prohibits the distribution of
devices which defeat the first protection measure, and section
1201(b)(1) prohibits the distribution of devices that defeat the second
protection measure.
There is no corresponding section banning the use of devices
prohibited by section 1201(b)(1) because any use of a device that
circumvents the technology used by the copyright holder to protect
her rights is restricted by the Copyright Act itself. For example,
assume that a CD comes with special software that prevents the user
from making a copy of the CD. If the user circumvents the anti-
copying software, the user is potentially liable for violating the
copyright owner's reproduction right. Such a violation does not need
to be banned by section 1201(b), since it is already considered an
infringement of the Copyright Act. Section 1201(b)(1) merely
prohibits the trafficking in devices that allow the user to circumvent
the anti-copying software contained on the CD. The obvious flaw in
this system is that there are many instances where circumventing the
anti-copying software would not result in liability for infringement
under the Copyright Act. For example, there is probably no
infringement if the user makes a copy of the CD for the purpose of
listening to the music on a portable cassette deck. So while the user
may have the legal right to circumvent the anti-copying software, the
distribution of devices that facilitate circumvention is prohibited.
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were part of
the United States' response to the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, passed in December 1996.9'
96. Id. § 12001(b)(1).
97. WIPO Copyright Treaty (Apr. 12,1997), Sen. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17.
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The WIPO Copyright Treaty requires, among other things, that
countries "provide 'adequate protection' against the circumvention of
technical measures used by copyright owners to protect their works
from infringement ... ,,98 Copyright scholar Pamela Samuelson
argues that the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions go far beyond
the protection required' by the WIPO Copyright Treaty and that the




On August 17, 2000, in one of the first legal tests of these new
provisions, a district court granted a permanent injunction against
defendants who placed decryption software on their web sites. 1 In
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, the defendants operated
web sites that distributed DeCSS, a software utility that circumvents
Content Scramble System (CSS). °2 CSS is an encryption program that
controls access to digital versatile disks (DVDs). °3 CSS allows the
playback, but not the copying, of DVDs on authorized playback
machines such as DVD players and DVD hard drives used with
certain computer operating systems.' The motion picture industry
also uses CSS to control which regions of the world will have access to
a particular DVD at a particular time in order to engage in sequential
release of the film."' A Norwegian teenager created Decrypt CSS
98. Samuelson, supra n. 9, at 521.
99. Id. at 534-57; see also Benkler, supra n. 9, at 416-30; Nimmer, supra n. 9.
100. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Reimerdes settled with the plaintiffs after the preliminary injunction was issued. Eric
Corley, who publishes 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, and maintains the 2600.com web site,
was the primary defendant when the decision was handed down in August 2000 and is the
principal defendant on appeal. Id. at 308.
101. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 345. The case is currently on appeal before the
Second Circuit. Rita Ciolli, Appeals Court Hears Case on DVD Code: High Stakes in
Encryption-As-Free-Speech Issue, Newsday A45 (May 1, 2001). Initial appellate briefs
were filed in January and February 2001.
102. Id. at 303.
103. Id. at 308.
104. Id.
105. Mike Godwin, Digital Millennium Copyright Act Spurs Controversy, E-
Commerce Law Weekly <http://www.law.com> (May 1, 2000). The practice of using
separate release "windows" for different media and different geographic locations allows
the distributor to extract the maximum revenues from each user population. Bruce M.
Owen & Steven S. Wildman, Video Economics, 26-52 (Harvard U. Press 1992).
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(DeCSS) to break the CSS copy protection system.'" DeCSS soon
began appearing on numerous web sites in the United States and
abroad. °7
The Motion Picture Association of America was successful in
convincing most web sites to remove DeCSS voluntarily.'9 Eight
motion picture companies then sued the defendants, who had refused
to remove DeCSS from their web sites, for violating section
1201(a)(2) of the Copyright Act."9 Judge Lewis Kaplan of the
Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction on
January 20, 2000."' After Judge Kaplan's preliminary injunction was
issued, the defendants removed DeCSS from the www.2600.com web
site and instead created links to numerous sites where users could still
download DeCSS."' The court issued a permanent injunction against
Corley in August 2000.112
A. Rejection of Statutory Defenses
Under section 1201(a)(2)(B), a defendant is liable for trafficking
in circumvention technology if that technology "has only limited
commercial significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work.""3
The defendants argued that the purpose of the DeCSS software was
to allow users to play DVDs on computers that use the Linux (rather
than Windows) operating system and that this is a permissible reason
to circumvent the access technology."4 The court rejected this
argument because the purpose of DeCSS was to circumvent
technology, and the reason for circumventing the technology was
irrelevant under the DMCA. "' The court held:
[D]efendants offered and provided DeCSS by posting it on
their web site. Whether defendants did so in order to
infringe, or to permit or encourage others to infringe,
copyrighted works in violation of other provisions of the
Copyright Act simply does not matter for the purpose of
106. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 312.
109. Id. at 303.
110. Id. at 312.
111. Id. at 313.
112. Id. at 344-45.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B).
114. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
115. Id. at 319.
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Section 1201(a)(2)."6
The defendants also tried to avail themselves of the exceptions to
copyright infringement contained in the statute by arguing that their
activity was protected by fair use.117 The court made clear in no
uncertain terms that this limitation on copyright liability did not apply
since the defendants were not being sued for copyright
infringement.' The court held that the defendants could not raise a
fair use defense since they were not sued for copyright infringement.
119 The court stated:
Defendants, however, are not here sued for copyright
infringement. They are sued for offering to the public and
providing technology designed to circumvent technological
measures that control access to copyrighted works and
otherwise violating Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act. If
Congress had meant the fair use defense to apply to such
actions, it would have said so. Indeed, as the legislative
history demonstrates, the decision not to make fair use a
defense to a claim under Section 1201(a) was quite
deliberate."
The court also noted that Congress had specifically and
purposefully written the law in such a way so that the Sony case
would not apply to violations of section 1201.121
Additionally, in fighting the preliminary injunction in January
2000, one defendant tried to claim immunity under section 512 of the
Copyright Act, which limits the liability of Internet service providers
for third-party infringement.'22 This section was included in the
DMCA along with the anti-circumvention provisions. 3 The court
held that section 512, like fair use, only applies to acts of
infringement, not to the distribution of circumvention technologies."2
116. Id.
117. Id. at 321-24.
118. Id. at 322.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 323-24.
122. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
123. For a discussion of section 512 of the DMCA, see Jackson, supra n. 9.
124. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (That defendant settled out of court before the
permanent injunction was issued and the issue of ISP liability was not addressed in the
court's August 17 decision.).
B. Linking Issues
A major issue that was not addressed when the court first
granted its preliminary injunction was whether the defendants could
link to other sites that offered the DeCSS software. Judge' Kaplan
noted that the statute makes it unlawful "to offer, provide, or
otherwise traffic in described technology." '125 The 'court then
articulated, for the first time, a test for trafficking in anti-
circumvention technology. "[T]he anti-trafficking provision of the
DMCA is implicated where 'one presents, holds out or makes a
circumvention technology or device available, knowing its nature, for
the purpose of allowing others to acquire it. '126 The court classified
various links from the defendant's site to other sites based upon the
amount of material available on the linked site, in addition to the
DeCSS program.127 Some links were designed to begin downloading
DeCSS as soon as the user selected the link."' The court held that for
this type of link, "[d]efendants are engaged in the functional
equivalent of transferring the DeCSS code to the user themselves.'
129
In other instances where the defendant's link takes the user to a web
page that has no content other than a selection to begin downloading
DeCSS, the court stated that the defendant still is considered to be
trafficking in circumvention technology.
130
The court noted that the decision is much more difficult if the
defendant links to a web page 'or site that contains "a good deal of
content other than DeCSS but that offers a hyperlink for
downloading, or transferring to a page for 'downloading, DeCSS. 13
The court held, however, that in this particular case the defendants
"urged others to post DeCSS '... then linked their site to those
'mirror' sites ... and proclaimed on their own site that DeCSS could
be had by clicking on the hyperlinks on defendants' site. By doing so,
they offered, provided or otherwise trafficked in DeCSS.'
' 2
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C. Rejection of First Amendment Defenses
The defendants in the Reimerdes case argued that the DeCSS
software was protected speech under the First Amendment and that
the DMCA was therefore unconstitutional."' The court
acknowledged that computer code is constitutionally protected
expression and proceeded with a First Amendment analysis.' The
court held section 1201 of the DMCA to be a content-neutral
restriction on speech because the purpose of the law was to regulate
the functionality of the computer code (to circumvent technological
protection measures) rather than to suppress the ideas of the
computer programmers who created DeCSS"' The court ruled that
the government's interest in protecting copyrighted works is
unrelated to the suppression of speech.'36
The court compared DeCSS to the biological spread of disease.'
Unlike a common source epidemic where a non-contagious disease is
spread only by the originating source; in a propagated outbreak
epidemic, the disease spreads from person to person. ' A common
source epidemic spreads slowly and can be traced back to its source,
much like tracing back a large-scale piracy operation to the printing
press where the infringing copies are printed.'3 9 A propagated
outbreak epidemic spreads exponentially and finding the "source"
does not prevent further spread of the disease since each infected
individual becomes a new source.' Therefore, the causal link
between trafficking in circumvention technology and its improper use
is close enough and harmful enough to restrict dissemination of the
computer code based on its functionality."'
The court stressed the narrowness of its holding, stating that the
restriction imposed (a permanent injunction on distribution of
DeCSS) is limited:
(1) to programs that circumvent access controls to
copyrighted works in digital form in circumstances in which
133. Id. at 327.
134. Id. at 329.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 330.
137. Id. at 331.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 332.
141. Id. at 331-32.
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(2) there is no other practical means of preventing
infringement through the use of the programs, and (3) the
regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent the
performance of the function for which the programs exist
rather than any message they might convey.
14 2
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the injunction
would be an impermissible prior restraint.143
The defense also claimed that section 1201(a)(2) is
unconstitutional because it is overbroad, arguing that the ban on
trafficking in circumvention technology makes it difficult or
impossible for those without the technical expertise to circumvent
technology for permissible uses, such as fair use.' The court noted
that where a statute targets primarily conduct rather than speech, the
overbreadth of the statute must be substantial.' The court refused to
consider overbreadth because (1) the interests of third parties are
varied and thus the record is inadequate to determine whether their
ability to engage in fair use is substantially hampered, (2) "there is no
reason to suppose here that prospective fair users will be deterred
from asserting their alleged rights by fear of sanctions imposed by the
DMCA or the Copyright Act," (3) the law regulates technology "that
is principally functional in nature," and (4) the statute contains an
exception for encryption research.'
The court then addressed the constitutionality of the DMCA's
ban on linking to web sites that contain circumvention software.'47
Applying intermediate scrutiny used for content-neutral regulations,
the court held that the same important governmental interest
unrelated to suppression of expression was at stake as the prior
analysis.'48 As to whether the regulation is the least restrictive means
of achieving that interest, the court noted that enjoining web sites that
post the software would be more effective and less restrictive than
enjoining the use of links to those web sites.4 9 However, given the
142. Id. at 333.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 336.
145. Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 339.
147. Earlier in his opinion, Judge Kaplan had held that linking, for the purpose of
disseminating circumvention technology, to a web page that contained little content other
than the circumvention software was prohibited by the statute and could be enjoined. See
supra nn. 126 - 132 and accompanying text.
148. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
149. Id. at 340.
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global nature of the Internet, it is likely that many of those web sites
would be outside the jurisdiction of the United States. " ' Therefore,
prohibiting the use of links would be the only effective means of
materially advancing the government's interest."'
The court then noted the likelihood that liability for linking to
sites, which contain prohibited circumvention technology, is likely to
have a chilling effect on speech by significantly reducing the use of
linking technology. Comparing the problem to that which faces the
press under defamation law, the court crafted a response to protect
those who create links from strict liability:
Accordingly, there may be no injunction against, nor liability
for, linking to a site containing circumvention technology,
the offering of which is unlawful under the DMCA, absent
clear and convincing evidence that those responsible for the
link (a) know at the relevant time that the offending material
is on the linked-to site, (b) know that it is circumvention
technology that may not be lawfully offered, and (c) create
or maintain the link for the purpose of disseminating that
technology. "2
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, issuing a
permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from posting DeCSS
software on their web site or linking to other web sites for the
purpose of distributing DeCSS software.'53
D. Key Issues on Appeal
The defendants filed their appeal with the Second Circuit on
January 19, 2001.' Various amici briefs in support of defendants
were filed soon thereafter.' Plaintiffs filed their reply brief in
February 2001."56 A summary of a few of the key issues discussed in
150. Id.
151. Id. at 339-40.
152. Id. at 341.
153. Id. at 346.
154. Br. of Pet., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2001) (available at
<http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVD-cases/20010119_ny-eff.appeal-brief.htm>).
155. E.g. Br. of Amicus Curiae Intell. Prop. L. Profs. in Support of Def.-Appellants,
Universal City Studio, 273 F.3d 429 (available at <http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/
MPAADVDcases/20010126_nylawprofs._amicus.htm>) hereinafter Br. of Amicus
Curiae Intell. Prop. L. Profs.), Br. of Amici Curiae Profs. Benkler and Lessig, Universal
City Studios, 273 F.3d 429 (available at <http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA DVDcases/
20010126_ny_2profs.amicus.htm>).
156. Br. of Respt., Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d 429 (available at
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the appellate briefs follows.
The defense argues that the publication of DeCSS is an
expressive act protected by the First Amendment because (1) the
code was published by a news magazine as part of a journalistic
enterprise, (2) the code itself is protected expression, and (3)
publication of DeCSS allows end users to engage in fair use, which is
protected by the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause.'57
Arguing first that the statute should be held up to strict scrutiny, the
defense argues that the statute targets specific content: speech that
explains how to circumvent technological measures.' The defense
then argues that the statute fails even intermediate scrutiny because it
is not narrowly tailored since it effectively eliminates most fair uses
and does not provide alternative means of expressing the content of
DeCSS. "' The defense also argues that, similar to speech, the links to
DeCSS are protected speech and at most rise to the level of advocacy
of unlawful action, not punishable incitement.16
The plaintiffs reply that the statute should be examined under
intermediate scrutiny because it targets conduct and not speech,
noting that the law targets the non-communicative impact of the
expression at issue. ' The plaintiffs assert that the statute and Judge
Kaplan's permanent injunction pass intermediate scrutiny, stating
that the statute is narrowly tailored since it only prohibits
disseminating anti-circumvention devices and does not prohibit
research or protest against the DMCA. 6 The plaintiffs support Judge
Kaplan's ruling that Corley does not have standing to raise a fair use
defense.'63 The plaintiffs argue that the defendants knowingly linked
to DeCSS for the purpose of distributing the circumvention
technology, thus making the incitement test irrelevant.' 64
<http://cryptome.org/mpaa-v-2600-bpa.htm>).
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VII
Analysis
While the legal arguments on each side of this case are intricate
and complex, some broader policy questions emerge.
* First, is the fair use doctrine constitutionally mandated to
reconcile copyright with the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment?
This article argues that fair use does support important free
speech interests that are not adequately protected by the
idea/expression dichotomy or the limited duration of copyright.
However, it must be acknowledged that no court has made so forceful
a statement to date. Yet, as society enters the "digital age" of the 21s
century, it is clear that information influences our culture and
conception of reality as never before.
Section 1201(b), which prevents the manufacture or distribution
of devices that circumvent the technological measures used to protect
the copyright owner's rights under the act, allows copyright owners to
dramatically expand their control over their works.' Copyright
owners might install technological measures that prevent all copying,
distribution, public performance, and public display of their works
(since these are some of the rights granted to the copyright owner),
even though there are countless situations where copying,
distribution, display, etc. are permitted under the statute. Users are
still free to circumvent these technological measures for a myriad of
noninfringing uses. The problem is that section 1201(b) now outlaws
the manufacture and distribution of the tools needed to accomplish
legal circumvention."'
Judge Kaplan noted the possible harm to fair use while
evaluating the First Amendment arguments of the defense.'67 He
articulates three ways in which someone might wish to make fair use
of a protected DVD: (1) quotation of the script, (2) use of the audio
soundtrack, and (3) use of the graphic images."6 Judge Kaplan notes
that the restrictions do not prevent anyone from quoting the dialogue
contained on the DVD.'69 The biggest threat posed by the DMCA is
165, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
166. For a more in-depth discussion of the ramifications of these provisions for free
speech, see Benkler, supra n. 9; Nimmer, supra n. 9; Samuelson, supra n. 9.
167. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 338.
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that many users will be unable to copy the soundtrack or visual
images contained in the DVD. 170 Judge Kaplan then conveniently
chose examples of prevented uses that make the harm seem trivial
indeed:
A television station might want to broadcast part of a
particular scene to illustrate a review.... A musicologist
perhaps would wish to play a portion of a musical sound
track. A film scholar might desire to create and exhibit to
students small segments of several different films to make
some comparative point about the cinematography or some
other characteristic.
71
These examples suggest that the law creates no harm other than
inconvenience; that the poor film professor will just have to bring all her
DVDs to class rather than copying the various scenes onto one disk.
The real harm is far more subtle. All of these uses allow
educators to praise or critique the original work encoded on the
DVD, but none of these uses go to the heart of fair use - namely the
transformation of the original work. The ability to appropriate texts
for the purpose of transformation, for example by juxtaposing scenes
from various films to create new meanings, is a vital form of
democratic dialogue. Artists often use such techniques to reveal new
truths about our society and ourselves. The new law threatens
precisely these legitimate uses of copyrighted texts, especially the use
of visual works such as motion pictures.
Copyright law developed during an era when the written word
was the primary means of communication and transmission of culture.
Yet, as the world enters the 21' Century, our communication and
culture is based increasingly on visual texts such as motion pictures,
television commercials, and computer graphics. "We live in a world
where nothing is what we were taught it was. Art is business, business
is war, war is advertising, and advertising is art.' ' 172 These "texts" are
just as significant as the written word in shaping our understanding of
the world. The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA limit the
ability of individuals to actively participate in the construction of
meaning. Even though we retain the right to criticize the media
artifacts that create our culture, we lose the ability to control the
process of cultural production itself.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 337.
172. Negativland, supra n. 2, at frontispiece.
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From an economic standpoint, the argument in favor of
transformative uses is a difficult policy position to defend. One can
quantify the cost to consumers that copyright infringement produces,
which is no doubt significant. In addition, few consumers are
interested in actively transforming cultural texts and engaging in the
kinds of transformative uses that are threatened by the new law. Most
consumers would likely accept the trade-off between more efficient
production of copyrighted works and fewer opportunities for
transformative works. Justin Hughes argues that the "silent majority"
of consumers would prefer that cultural texts have stable meanings
and that the process of "recoding" which gives these works new
meanings imposes an additional cost on those consumers."'
On the other side of the policy argument, it is impossible to
quantify the cost to society when fewer transformative works are
produced. This article argues that the threat to free speech and
control over cultural dialogue and debate should be considered a
potential cost to society. This is especially true if one accepts the
argument that the battle over contested meanings is essentially a
political struggle."4 What makes the anti-circumvention provisions so
troubling is that they prevent courts from engaging in fair use
analysis. Indeed, as technology becomes the primary means of
protecting content, courts (and the constitutional limits on copyright)
are removed entirely.
* Second, can Congress give copyright owners powers that
extend their control beyond the Copyright Clause?
Congress intentionally placed sections 1201 and 1202 outside of
the parameters of copyright. The Committee acknowledged and
dismissed the fears of copyright scholars that these new provisions
would grant copyright owners greatly enhanced powers. 5 Sixty-two
law professors wrote to Congress, stating:
[E]nactment of [the anti-circumvention provisions] would
represent an unprecedented departure into the zone of what
might be called paracopyright-an uncharted new domain of
legislative provisions designed to strengthen copyright
protection by regulating conduct which traditionally has fallen
outside the regulatory sphere of intellectual property law.
173. Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923 (1999).
174. See the discussion of fair use, supra Part II.
175. H.R. Rpt. 105-551 (II), at 24-25.
176. Id.
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The Committee merely responded, "As technology advances, so
must our laws.',
177
Sections 1201(a) and 1201(b) create separate but distinct threats
to the current copyright law. Section 1201(a), which grants copyright
owners technological control over access to their works, appears to do
no more than prevent users from "stealing" the content.l8 From this
perspective, section 1201(a) is very similar to the laws prohibiting the
theft of cable and wireless programming. 79 When Congress added the
prohibition on cable theft in the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 there appears to have been no public outcry regarding the
potential loss of access to copyrighted works.' s The key distinction
between restricting access to subscription television service and
restricting access to all copyrighted works is that the first sale doctrine
is inapplicable to subscription television service."' The first sale
doctrine allows the owner of a lawful copy to sell, lease, lend or
otherwise dispose of that copy.'82 This clause allows video stores to
rent movies, bookstores to sell used books, record stores to sell used
CDs, and individuals to sell, lend, or give away books, videotapes,
CDs, etc. Under section 1201(a), copyright owners potentially could
adopt technological measures that prevent anyone but the original
buyer from accessing the work, thereby defeating the first sale
doctrine.'83
The District Court in Reimerdes acknowledged that the DMCA
as applied will have the practical effect of severely limiting fair use
and potentially giving copyright owners control over works that are in
the public domain." Therefore, the law clearly extends control
beyond that authorized under the Copyright Act and the Copyright
Clause. In an amici brief filed by a group of 47 law professors in
support of Corley and his fellow defendants, a compelling argument is
made that Congress does not have the authority to grant copyright
owners powers under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and
177. Id. at 25.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
179. See supra n. 117.
180. See generally Pub. L No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
v553 (2001)); H.R. Rpt. 98-934, at 83-85 (Aug. 1, 1984).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2001).
182. Id. § 109(a). However, possessors are prohibited from renting sound recordings
and computer programs for personal advantage. Id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
183. See supra n. 21 and accompanying text.
184. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 338, 338 n. 245.
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Proper Clause, that are denied to Congress under the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment.'
* Third, can Congress constitutionally overturn the staple article
of commerce doctrine articulated in Sony if doing so significantly
infringes on free speech?
The DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions and the Reimerdes
decision offer insight into how the law of copyright is changing.
Rather than focusing solely on users who commit copyright
infringement, copyright owners are targeting the individuals and
corporations that provide the technology that facilitates infringement.
In the past, these defendants could be found liable only through the
theory of contributory infringement articulated in Sony186 or the
limited circumstances surrounding theft of television service and
serial copying of digital recordings."8
The Reimerdes case concerns Congress' ability to overturn Sony,
since this is the practical effect of the DMCA. Or, phrased more
generally, to what extent can the state regulate technology that
implicates free speech interests? There are compelling arguments on
both sides. Copyright owners undoubtedly have a right to use
technological measures to control their content. The question is
whether the government can use the force of the state to protect
those technological measures.
The DMCA limits the scope of the Sony ruling by prohibiting the
use of circumvention technology unless that technology has a
''commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure."'" This clause is significantly more limiting
than the test for contributory infringement outlined in the Sony
holding. Under Sony, the purveyor of the technology need only
demonstrate that there are substantial noninfringing reasons for using
the technology. 9 Under the DMCA, it is irrelevant whether the end
user is committing copyright infringement. Instead the question
becomes whether the circumvention technology has substantial uses
other than to defeat the copyright owner's anti-circumvention
technology."9°
One distinction between Sony and the anti-circumvention
185. Br. of Amicus Curiae Intell. Prop. L. Profs., Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d 429.
186. See supra Part III.
187. See supra Part IV.
188. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
189. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
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provisions is that Sony asks whether the technology has substantial
noninfringing uses, while section 1201 of the DMCA asks whether the
technology has substantial noncircumventing uses.' 9' Whether there
are substantial noninfringing reasons to use circumvention tools is
irrelevant. For example, under Reimerdes, a court might find that the
use of DeCSS to view DVDs on Linux operating systems is a
substantial noninfringing use. Therefore, under Sony, the distribution
of DeCSS might not constitute contributory copyright infringement-
just as the use of VCRs for time-shifting was considered acceptable.
However, as Judge Kaplan noted, such an analysis is irrelevant under
section 1201 of the DMCA, which only asks whether DeCSS has any
substantial uses other than to unlock the CSS copy protection
system.9 Thus, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA
increase the scope of the copyright owner's power by (1) creating a
cause of action separate from contributory infringement and (2)
limiting the reach of the statute's defenses to copyright infringement.
If a copyright owner distributed her content only to movie
theaters, few would suggest that anyone had a right to enter the
theater free of charge to see the uncopyrighted portion of the content.
Nor is it likely that a ban on recording devices in the theater, enforced
through state action, would be considered an abridgement of free
speech. Similarly, suppose HBO were to produce a documentary that
contained mostly uncopyrightable expression. HBO could impose
limits on public access to that documentary (for example through
encryption and subscription fees), and the state could prevent
individuals from finding ways around those limits.'93 So when
discussing the public performance of content, most commentators
accept the fact that copyright owners can impose limits on access to
the performance, regardless of the resulting impact on fair use or
uncopyrightable expression. The state can assist copyright owners in
enforcing those limits without running afoul of the Constitution. In a
sense, copyright owners are merely asking for the same control when
they choose to distribute copies of their works instead of performing
them. One could argue that the ban on circumvention technology
simply gives owners the same control they may already exert over
access to public performances.
On the other hand, it would clearly be unconstitutional for the
191. Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 with 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
192. See supra n. 116 and accompanying text.
193. See the discussion of the Communication Act's ban on "black boxes," supra Part
IV(A).
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government to outlaw the distribution of printing presses, copy
machines, or pencils to prevent the harm that counterfeiting or
criticism may inflict. Those opposed to the DMCA's restrictions on
circumvention technology argue that, like a ban on pencils, the ban
on circumvention software imposes a burden on speech that far
outweighs the harm of potential copyright infringement. Since the
government's substantial interest in enacting the DMCA was to
prevent the harm of copyright infringement, it is appropriate that the
court look at the impact of the law on legitimate noninfringing uses.
The Reimerdes court refused to engage in such an analysis.
In addition, under Reimerdes, the law appears to give the
copyright owner control over what hardware may be used to gain
access to the copyrighted material. Imagine a Sony compact disk that
could only be played legally on a Sony CD player, just as the old Sony
Betamax videotapes were incompatible with other videotape players.
Under the DMCA, it would be illegal to build a videotape player
compatible with Betamax tapes if doing so would circumvent an
"access technology." The Reimerdes court noted that the DVD Copy
Control Association is willing to license the technology for Linux
operating systems, and that it is possible that a refusal to license could
result in antitrust litigation.19 ' However, the DMCA potentially forces
the user to view her DVD on a player of the copyright owner's
choosing. The motion picture industry has acknowledged that it uses
CSS in part to limit access to DVDs to particular geographic regions,
asserting that the copyright owner has the right to grant authorization
to use copyrighted content only on specific technologies of the
copyright owner's choosing. Users who own lawful copies of DVDs
containing the CSS encryption system would be prohibited from
playing their DVDs on unauthorized systems, even though playing




Copyright owners used the 1984 prohibition on technology,
which was designed primarily to prevent the theft of cable and
195. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
195. In the Reimerdes case, the court noted in dicta that the legislative history of the
DMCA suggests that it would not be a violation of section 1201(a) for a user who has
obtained authorized access to circumvent an access restriction, but the plain language of
the statute offers no such exception. Id. at 318.
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satellite service, to gain technological control over their content
without resorting to copyright law. Their timing was perfect because
the Sony decision, also rendered in 1984, limited the use of copyright
law to control technology. The recording industry added new
technological control measures in 1992 with the AHRA's
requirement that digital tape recorders be equipped with anti-copying
technology. The DMCA goes dramatically beyond the limited
protection offered to technological measures under the
Communications Act and the AHRA. 96
The DMCA was passed with the express purpose of facilitating
electronic commerce and protecting intellectual property rights.19
The federal government's intervening brief on behalf of the plaintiffs
notes that Congress enacted the DMCA to "[join] an international
effort to- make the Internet a more secure business forum." 't98 Bowing
to the protests of librarians, educators, and others, the law authorizes
the Copyright Office to create exemptions allowing certain users to
circumvent the technological restrictions adopted by copyright
owners.19 9 However, those users will be hard pressed to find the
circumvention tools necessary to circumvent the protection
technology since the same statute prohibits both the manufacturing
and distributing of circumvention tools.
The DMCA encourages copyright owners to adopt technological
measures that provide extralegal protection for their works, and
offers strong legal protection for these technological measures.
Copyright owners can use these measures to expand control over
their works beyond the limits created by the Copyright Act,
effectively limiting the first sale doctrine, fair use, and the other
provisions of the law that achieve copyright's delicate constitutional
balance. If other courts adopt the same interpretation of the law as
Judge Kaplan, the statutory and constitutional limits on copyright will
be more difficult to enforce.
The Reimerdes case offers a glimpse of one possible outcome of
recent trends in copyright law. Copyright owners appear to be making
a coordinated attack on technology in an effort to gain more control
over their works. For example, while the lawsuits against Napster and
Scour (like all cases) are fact-specific, the fact remains that the
196. In addition, the DMCA also requires analog VCRs to incorporate anticopying
technology for the first time. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k).
197. H.R. Rpt. 105-551 (II), at 21-23.
198. Br. of Intervenor U.S.A., Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d 429 (available at
<http:/www.cryptome.org/mpaa-v-2600-usa.htm>).
199. See supra n. 90 and accompanying text.
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recording industry has chosen to sue the purveyor of the technology
rather than the individual users who are committing infringement.200
The same is true for MP3Board.com, which the RIAA has sued to
prevent automated search engines from providing links to MP3 web
sites." These cases, along with Reimerdes, all involve technologies
that enhance the ability of individuals to share information in digital
form.
There is no simple solution to problem of increased infringement
as a result of new technology. But the focus on restricting technology
sets a dangerous precedent that threatens innovation, efficiency, the
development of communication networks, and free speech. A better
solution is to focus on using technology to develop more efficient
methods of tracing infringing activity to its source. Thus, the use of
digital watermarks or other means to hold individuals responsible for
their infringing behavior is less onerous than restricting the use of
communication technology.
The trend in legislation and lawsuits is to focus on technology
rather than infringing conduct. While it is easy for policymakers to
offer technological solutions in an age of rapid technological change,
such solutions do not allow for important free speech safeguards that
have been developed over the years. As policymakers debate laws
that enhance electronic commerce, they must not lose sight of the fact
that the internet's true strength and promise is as a communication
medium-not a sales medium. As Lawrence Lessig notes:
In every context that it can, the entertainment industry is
trying to force the Internet into its own business model-the
perfect control of content. From music (fighting MP3) and
film (fighting the portability of DVD), to television, the
industry is resisting the Net's original design. It was about
the free flow of content; Hollywood wants perfect control
instead. 2
Technological solutions usurp the important role of courts in
balancing the interests of copyright owners and the general public.
This is but one result of the change in copyright from a legal concept
200. John Borland, CNET News.com, RIAA Asks Judge to Pull All Major-Label
Songs OFF Napster <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2066662.html> (June 12,
2000).
201. Brad King, Wired, RIAA: No Hyperlinking Allowed <http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,37227,.00.html> (June 26, 2000).
202. Lawrence Lessig, The Standard, Cyberspace Prosecutor <www.thestandard.com/
article/display/1,1151,1.0885,00.html> (Feb. 21, 2000).
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to a technological concept. As Negativland points out:
[T]he commercial entrepreneurs who now own and operate
mass culture are apparently intent on obliterating all
distinctions between the needs of art and the needs of
commerce .... Both our courts and our corporations are
now in the untenable position of assuming that once a work
becomes a saleable object, that becomes its only significant
role in society, and that role is the only one that the law
should be concerned with.2 °3
203. Negativland, supra n. 2, at frontispiece.
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